Macro News, Riskfree Rates, and the Intermediary by Menkveld, Albert J. et al.
TI 2007-086/2 
Tinbergen Institute Discussion Paper 
 
Macro News, Riskfree Rates, and the 
Intermediary 
 Albert J. Menkveld1 
Asani Sarkar2 
Michel van der Wel1 
 
1 Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam, and Tinbergen Institute; 
2 Federal Reserve Bank of New York. 
 
 
  
Tinbergen Institute 
The Tinbergen Institute is the institute for 
economic research of the Erasmus Universiteit 
Rotterdam, Universiteit van Amsterdam, and Vrije 
Universiteit Amsterdam. 
 
Tinbergen Institute Amsterdam 
Roetersstraat 31 
1018 WB Amsterdam 
The Netherlands 
Tel.: +31(0)20 551 3500 
Fax: +31(0)20 551 3555 
 
Tinbergen Institute Rotterdam 
Burg. Oudlaan 50 
3062 PA Rotterdam 
The Netherlands 
Tel.: +31(0)10 408 8900 
Fax: +31(0)10 408 9031 
 
 
 
Most TI discussion papers can be downloaded at 
http://www.tinbergen.nl. 
 
Macro News, Riskfree Rates, and the Intermediary:
Customer Orders for 30Y Treasury Futures
Albert J. Menkveld1
Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam, Tinbergen Institute
De Boelelaan 1105, 1081 HV Amsterdam, Netherlands
albertjmenkveld@gmail.com
Asani Sarkar
Federal Reserve Bank of New York
33 Liberty Street, NY 10045, New York
asani.sarkar@ny.frb.org
Michel van der Wel
Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam, Tinbergen Institute
De Boelelaan 1105, 1081 HV Amsterdam, Netherlands
mwel@feweb.vu.nl
November 20072
1Corresponding author.
2The views stated here are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the
Federal Reserve Bank of New York or the Federal Reserve System. We appreciate the comments
of Soehnke Bartram, Michael Fleming, Clifton Green, Terry Hendershott, Charles Jones, Richard
Lyons, and participants at the “Microstructure of Equity and FX Markets” conference in Ottawa,
the “International Conference on High Frequency Finance” conference in Konstanz, the Merton H.
Miller doctoral seminar at the FMA2007, and a Federal Reserve Bank of New York seminar. We
are grateful to the Netherlands Organization for Scientific Research (NWO) for a VENI grant and
travel support. We are responsible for all errors.
Abstract
Macro News, Riskfree Rates, and the Intermediary:
Customer Orders for 30Y Treasury Futures
Signed customer order flow correlates with permanent price changes in equity and nonequity
markets. We exploit macro news events in the 30Y treasury futures market to identify
causality from customer flow to riskfree rates. We remove the positive feedback trading part
and establish that, in the 15 minutes subsequent to the news, intermediaries rely on customer
orders to determine a substantial part of the announcement’s effect on riskfree rates, i.e. one-
third relative to the instantaneous effect. They appear to benefit from privately observing
informed customers, as, in the cross-section, their own-account trade profitability correlates
with access to customer flow, controlling for volatility, competition, and the macro “surprise.”
Keywords: discount rate, macroeconomic announcements, customer order flow, intermediary,
treasury futures
JEL: G14, E44
Signed customer order flow correlates with permanent price changes.1 In the equity
market, a common explanation is that investors initiate trades based on private information
on a stock’s future dividends. There is, however, growing evidence that, beyond such id-
iosyncratic effect, order flow correlates with changes in the state of the economy.2 Canonical
models in microstructure3 interpret such correlation as causality from order flow to prices,
but a popular alternative hypothesis is reverse causality through feedback trading.
This paper aims to establish causality from customer flow to riskfree rates through
an analysis of macro news in the 30Y treasury futures market. The key to identification
is that we observe the news, its instantaneous effect on the riskfree rate, and the, indeed,
positively correlated subsequent customer flow.4 We document that, after removing the
effects of feedback trading, the 5-minute change in the 30Y riskfree rate is significantly more
sensitive to customer flow in the 15 minutes after the announcement. We decompose the
(explained) 15-minute rate change variance and find that 76.0% is immediate and 24.0% is
due to the (orthogonalized) customer flow.
We add to a growing body of empirical evidence on order flow in treasury markets.
Brandt and Kavajecz (2004) find that order flow is a significant explanatory variable in daily
treasury return regressions. As for macro news, early papers report an instantaneous effect,
but also increased volatility in the minutes after the announcement.5 And, consistent with
our findings, Green (2004) documents increased sensitivity of treasury returns to order flow
in the first 15 minutes after the announcement. Pasquariello and Vega (2007) find that the
correlation increases with preannouncement dispersion of analyst forecasts. These papers are
based on GovPX data, which contains the interdealer order flow of the interdealer brokers.
Our key contribution is to establish directly the increased sensitivity of riskfree rates
to customer order flow. Such effect is difficult to identify indirectly from the interdealer
flow examined by Green (2004). Although this interdealer flow reflects customer flow6, its
1Customer buys (sells) get a positive (negative) sign.
2For equity markets, for example, Hasbrouck and Seppi (2001) identify a common factor in order flow
that significantly correlates with daily market returns. Edelen and Warner (2001) find correlated mutual
fund flow to be part of this factor. Saar (2007) proposes a model where order flow is informative on unknown
preferences and endowments of investors. For the FX market, Evans and Lyons (2002) find that order flow
explains more than 50% of daily DM/US$ returns. Moreover, Evans and Lyons (2007) find that (unobserved)
monthly order flow predicts macro news that will be released in the oncoming months.
3E.g., Glosten and Milgrom (1985), Kyle (1985), and Stoll (1978).
4We decompose subsequent order flow variance and attribute 6.7% of the flow’s explanatory power to
positive feedback trading, i.e. net buying (selling) after a positive (negative) instantaneous price adjustment
(see section 2).
5See, e.g., Ederington and Lee (1993) and Fleming and Remolona (1999).
6Dealers typically accommodate a customer order completely and then actively unload their inventory
in the interdealer market. For example, a customer sell order therefore creates a series of sell orders in the
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effect is not necessarily due to customer flow for two reasons. First, the intermediary might
initiate trades based on a private signal orthogonal to customer flow.7 For example, Anand
and Subrahmanyam (2007) find that for the Toronto stock exchange the most informative
trades are initiated by intermediaries unrelated to how much access they have to customer
flow. Second, the intermediary could affect sensitivity endogenously through own-account
trades on privately observing the composition of customer order flow. That is, she trades
along with informed customers and opposite to uninformed customers. The aggregate (i.e.
customer plus own-account) order she passes on to other market makers therefore amplifies
the information part and reduces the noise part of the customer order. Zero-profit market
makers rationally charge higher price concessions to protect themselves against such flow-
based speculation.8
We analyze 42.5 million trades in the highly liquid 30Y treasury futures market in
1994 through 1997 for the following reasons. First, it allows us to discriminate customer
trades from the intermediary’s own-account trades. Second, we do not need an algorithm
to sign trades, as the data identifies buyer and seller initiated customer trades. Third,
it has a sizable cross-section of 3,382 intermediaries. Fourth, it is comprehensive, as 30Y
treasury futures capture 95% of the trading volume in the spot and futures markets for this
maturity.9 Fifth, the 30Y maturity is likely to make this treasury bond very sensitive to
changes in riskfree rates.
We further analyze postannouncement trading to establish that the increased sen-
sitivity of riskfree rate changes to customer flow reflects information. We realize that in
inactive markets any regression of price change on signed flow might pick up a transitory
price effect to compensate for the cost of market-making. For example, the increased sensitiv-
ity might reflect that risk-averse dealers require higher compensation for carrying inventory
through time on increased postannouncement volatility. We consider this noninformation
explanation unlikely for our five-minute regressions in what is a very active market. That is,
aggregate interdealer market. See Lyons (2001, Ch. 4.4) for a discussion of such “hot potato trading.”
7Green (2004), e.g., offers as explanation for his findings that market participants vary in their ability to
interpret the news, with reference to Kim and Verrecchia (1994, 1997).
8The idea that intermediaries benefit from discriminating informed from uninformed flow is well-
established in the literature. Market markers cream-skim uninformed flow (see, e.g., Beneviste, Marcus, and
Wilhelm (1992), Easley, Kiefer, and O’Hara (1996) and Chung, Chuwonganant, and McCormick (2004)).
Brokers trade along informed flow (Fishman and Longstaff (1992)) or against uninformed flow (Roell (1990),
Madrigal (1996)). Appendix A illustrates the idea in a Kyle (1985) setup and includes a rational response
of the informed customer who reduces her order size in anticipation of the intermediary’s speculation.
9This calculation is from Fleming and Sarkar (1999) who use 1993 spot market data for “on-the-run”
securities (i.e. the most recently issued security in a maturity). The authors use GovPX data and adjust
with GovPX coverage ratios to estimate total spot market volume (see also Fleming (2003)).
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for an average announcement day five-minute interval, 172.9 intermediaries generate 595.9
transactions. Moreover, if we regress interest rate changes on the subset of customer orders
that trades through intermediaries who do not trade for own-account that day, we find un-
changed sensitivity. This is not an order size effect, as customer orders in this subset are
larger than the average customer order. Therefore, we interpret the increased sensitivity
result as consistent with flow-based speculation of intermediaries who endogenously choose
to piggy-back on orders that they privately observe to originate from informed customers.
We exploit the cross-section of intermediaries and relate own-account profitability to
customer flow access to provide direct evidence of flow-based speculation. We find two key
results. First, we report that own-account trade profitability is higher for intermediaries who
walk customer orders to the floor (“duals”) relative to those who do not (“locals”), which
controls for the cost of market-making.10 Second, we exploit the cross-section of duals to
show that their own-account profitability increases with access to customer flow, where we
control for volatility, competition, and the macro “surprise.” Intermediaries therefore appear
to trade profitably on the information in customer flow, which feeds our earlier concern that
(part of) the increased sensitivity of riskfree rate change to (aggregate) interdealer flow might
be endogenously generated.
We entertain the alternative explanation that intermediaries with superior trading
skill are likely to attract more customers (see, e.g., Grossman (1989)), which makes the
correlation between own-account profitability and access to customer flow entirely spurious.
To control for skill, we compare an intermediary’s own-account profitability on announcement
days where she has access to customer flow relative to announcement days where she does not
and find significantly increased profitability on days where she has access to customer flow.
Furthermore, we find that on the announcement days that she does not trade for customers,
her own-account profitability is not significantly different from own-account profitability of
locals. These results rule out that exceptional trading skill drives a dual trader’s rents.11
We analyze customer profits to identify who pays the dual’s rents on flow-based
speculation. If fully competitive market makers cannot infer which order flow is informed,
they rationally charge all flow an increased price concession and the dual’s rents are, there-
fore, effectively paid for by all customers. If, on the other hand, they get a signal on which
intermediary is likely to have the informed flow (and trades for own-account), they charge
10We find evidence consistent with an increased cost of market-making due to higher postannouncement
volatility, as (gross) own-account profitability is higher (and bid-ask spreads are higher) on announcement
days relative to nonannouncement days.
11We interpret trading skill broadly to include an ability to quickly process and interpret macro news as
in Kim and Verrecchia (1994, 1997).
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only her an increased price concession, and, as a result, only her customers pay the dual’s
rent. We find evidence for the latter explanation as dual-intermediated customer profits are
lower than nondual-intermediated customer profits.
Finally, we contribute to the dual-trading literature. Chakravarty and Li (2003)
study eight CME futures contracts and find that dual traders supply liquidity and actively
manage inventory. Manaster and Mann (1996) corroborate these findings in their CME
futures study, but, much to their surprise, also report a positive correlation between signed
inventory and the intermediary reservation price. They conclude that intermediaries are
not “passive order-fillers,. . . but active profit-seeking individuals with heterogeneous levels
of information and/or trading skill.” We establish that one channel is access to informative
customer flow. Most related to our study is Fishman and Longstaff (1992) who emphasize
that the decision to trade for own-account is endogenous, i.e. the intermediary does so
if she has private knowledge on the composition of her customer order flow. Contrary to
our results, they find for 15 random days soybean’s futures trading that dual-intermediated
customer profits are significantly higher than nondual-intermediated customer profits. We
interpret their result as evidence that market makers do not get any signal as to which
intermediary carries the informed flow.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 1 discusses the institu-
tional background, the data, and provides summary statistics. Section 2 studies customer
order flow informativeness on announcement days (relative to nonannouncement days). Sec-
tion 3 calculates the intermediary’s own-account trading profit and relates it to access to
customer flow. Section 4 analyzes who effectively pays the intermediary’s rents. Section 5
concludes.
1 Background, data, and summary statistics
1.1 Background
We analyze four years (1994-1997) of trading in 30Y treasury futures at the Chicago Board of
Trade (CBOT). At the time, this contract is one of the most liquid securities with roughly 50
trades per minute.12 Almost all trading is floor trading from 8.20 a.m. to 3.00 p.m. Eastern
12See Table 2. Note that this table necessarily double-counts, as we also report trade activity by trader
type. We double-count throughout the paper in order to be consistent.
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Time (ET), although after-hours electronic trading volume had been growing. Trading occurs
in a pit by means of the so-called open outcry method. Floor traders negotiate prices by
shouting out orders to other floor traders, indicating quantity and trade direction through
hand signals. Other floor traders bid on the orders, also using hand signals. Once filled,
an order is recorded separately by both parties to a trade. At the end of the day, the
clearinghouse settles trades and ensures that there is no discrepancy in the matched trade
information.
After a criminal inquiry in 1989, the Commodity Futures Trading Commission
(CFTC)—the main regulatory body of futures exchanges—continues to allow dual trading,
but tightens surveillance. The FBI sting operation at the CBOT and the Chicago Mercan-
tile Exchange (CME) finds that brokers (including dual traders) are cheating customers and
leads to dozens of arrests. In 1992, Congress mandates that futures markets keep audit trails.
The CFTC pressures both CBOT and CME to supply the information with the threat of a
dual trading ban, in case the exchanges fail to comply.13 Today, dual trading continues to be
allowed in most futures markets. The exceptions are some CME futures contracts, mostly
those with a history of high volume.
1.2 Data
Futures data. We benefit from the CFTC audit trail data to discriminate customer trades
and own-account trades in the 30Y treasury futures market. Each transaction record con-
tains: Contract traded (i.e. the expiration month); time14; buy or sell indicator; number of
contracts traded; price; identification number for the floor trader who executes the trade;
and a customer type indicator (CTI code). These CTI codes are defined in CFTC rule
1.35(e) as: CTI1 is a trade for own account; CTI2 is a trade for clearing member’s house
account; CTI3 is a trade for another member present at the exchange floor, or an account
controlled by such other member; CTI4 is a trade for (off-exchange) customers. Consistent
with earlier studies15 we restrict attention to CTI1 and CTI4 trades as they represent most
of the trading volume.
13See, e.g., “CFTC demands tighter controls,” Financial Times, 8/13/96.
14Traders report time in 15-minute brackets and an exchange algorithm, known as computerized trade
reconstruction (CTR), times the trade to the nearest second. Although noisy, we believe the CTR time is
fairly accurate due to Congress and CFTC pressure to provide high-quality data for surveillance. Others
have used CTR time for analysis, e.g. Fishman and Longstaff (1992) and Manaster and Mann (1996).
15E.g., Fishman and Longstaff (1992), Manaster and Mann (1996), and Chakravarty and Li (2003).
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We focus on the nearby futures contract and apply a number of filters to prepare the
data for analysis. We choose to analyze the nearby contract, as it is a very close substitute
for the underlying spot instrument. Consequently, we feel that our results generalize to
spot rates (see also Ederington and Lee (1993, p.1164)). We apply the following filters.
We eliminate spread trades (e.g., butterfly spread trades). We remove trades that occur
at unusually low prices (primarily in May 1997). We remove trades that show an unusual
transaction return of more than 0.25% followed by a transaction return in the opposite
direction of more than 0.25%. We expect these trades to suffer from a serious timing error.
These filters eliminate 1.48% of all CTI1 and CTI4 transactions. The final sample includes
42.5 million observations.
Macro announcements We follow Green (2004) and use the International Money
Market Services (MMS) data on expectations and realizations of the most relevant 8:30 U.S.
macro announcements. We are careful to remove days with macro announcements scheduled
at a time later in the day (primarily 10:00) to create benchmark nonannouncement days
that are not contaminated by macro news trading.16 We further remove (i) days when either
the realized value or the expectation is missing, (ii) days when the Fed announces earlier or
later relative to schedule, (iii) days with unexpected Fed announcements, (iv) days where
the market is partially or completely closed.17
[insert Table 1]
Table 1 lists the 15 macro announcements included in the sample and reports their
frequencies. In total, the sample contains 377 announcement days and 350 nonannouncement
days. In addition to an analysis of all announcement days, we also analyze the subgroup
of most influential announcements—nonfarm payroll employment, PPI, and CPI—but also
“nonfarm payroll” as a separate group as it is the single most important announcement (see
also, e.g., Green (2004, Table III)).
We define announcement surprises as the difference between realizations and expec-
tations. More specifically, since measurement units vary across macro variables, we stan-
dardize the surprises by dividing each of them by their sample standard deviation. The
surprise Skt of type k on day t is therefore
Skt =
Rkt −Mkt
σk
(1)
16This also removes days with an 8:30 and a 10:00 announcement. The remaining announcement days are
therefore 8:30-only announcement days.
17These days are 4/1/94, 4/5/94, 9/14/94, 8/26/96, 2/26/97, and 2/27/97.
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where Rkt is the announced value,Mkt is its MMS median forecast that proxies for the market
expectation, and σk is the sample standard deviation of (Rkt −Mkt). Eqn. (1) facilitates
meaningful comparisons of how the 30Y riskfree rate responds to the different types of macro
news. Operationally, we estimate these responses by regressing 30Y treasury futures price
changes on the surprise Skt. We note that since σk is constant for any indicator k, the
standardization does not affect the statistical significance of the response estimates nor the
fit of the regressions.
1.3 Summary statistics
[insert Figure 1]
Figure 1 plots transaction prices and volume on a random macro announcement day.
It illustrates some trade characteristics that turn out to be true more generally. First, the 8:30
announcement leads to an instantaneous price change of almost 1%. Second, customer order
flow increases by over 400% in the subsequent minutes, but levels off quickly. Third, during
this time price changes, relative to preannouncement changes, are substantially higher and
their direction appears to correlate with signed customer flow. These findings are consistent
with earlier papers (see, e.g., Fleming and Remolona (1999) and Green (2004)).
[insert Figure 2]
Intraday patterns. Figure 2 presents the intraday patterns of volatility, the bid-
ask spread, and volume. We use all 377 announcement days and 350 nonannoucement days
to calculate the value for each 15-minute interval and we estimate the patterns through
regressions. We use GMM for all regressions in the paper and we use robust Newey-West
standard errors (where we allow for autocorrelation up to three lags). We plot our esti-
mates and we add a closed (open) circle when the difference between announcement and
nonannouncement days is significant at the 1% (5%) level.
Panel (A) shows that volatility is significantly higher in the first half of the an-
nouncement day with a clear peak in the first 15 minutes after the announcement. To avoid
a bias due to the bid-ask bounce, we define volatility as the standard deviation of customer
buy transaction prices18 (see also Manaster and Mann (1996)). We find a significant spike
18Operationally, to minimize missing values, we calculate two standard deviations, one based on customer
buys, the other on customer sells. We take the maximum if both are available.
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in volatility of roughly 300% in the 15 minutes after the announcement. For the rest of the
day, volatility levels remain increased relative to nonannouncement days, but the increase is
substantially lower as it never exceeds 25%. The increase is statistically significant only in
the early half of the day.
Panels (B) and (C) show a significant volume increase throughout the trading day,
but, interestingly, we only find a significantly increased bid-ask spread in the first 15 minutes
after the announcement. We report aggregate volume (i.e. customer plus own-account vol-
ume) and find its increase to be similar in magnitude to the volatility increase. We estimate
the bid-ask spread as the difference between the average (volume-weighted) customer buy
price and the average customer sell price (see also Manaster and Mann (1996)). We only
find a significant increase at the 1% level in the first 15 minutes after the announcement.
Economically, the increase is substantial as it exceeds 120%.
All in all, these patterns are consistent with Green (2004) who documents increased
informed trading only for the first 15 minutes after the announcement. Our volatility and
bid-ask spread patterns are consistent. The increased volume in the remainder of the day
might reflect inventory-sharing trades among market makers who are pushed into suboptimal
positions in the first 15 minutes.
Customer vs. own-account trades. As it is our objective to further understand
these trading patterns, we exploit our sample’s feature that it discriminates customer trades
and own-account trades. We follow the literature (see, e.g., Fishman and Longstaff (1992))
and disaggregate volume for each day according to (i) whether the intermediary trades for
customers and own-account that day19 and (ii) whether the trade is a customer trade or an
own-account trade. We label the order flow accordingly, i.e. we get four categories:
1. Customer trades through brokers, i.e. customer trades through an intermediary who
does not trade for own account
2. Own-account trades by locals, i.e. own-account trades of an intermediary who does
not trade for customers
3. Customer trades through duals, i.e. customer trades through an intermediary who also
trades for own account
19We use a 2% error margin for classification (i.e., no own-account trades means less than 2% of the
intermediary’s trades are for own-account) as CFTC and exchange staff acknowledge the presence of error
trades and consider the 2% filter reasonable (see Chang, Locke, and Mann (1994)).
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4. Own-account trades by duals, i.e. own-account trades of an intermediary who also
trades for customers
We emphasize that an intermediary’s label as broker, local, or dual is based on her activity
on a particular day and, throughout the sample, an intermediary can therefore have broker
days, local days, and dual days.
[insert Table 2]
Table 2 presents trade statistics for announcement as well as nonannouncement days.
Panel A testifies to the high activity in the 30Y treasury futures market. On nonannounce-
ment days, we find that, on average, in a five-minute interval 146.0 traders are active who
generate 458.2 transactions. On announcement days, the number of active traders increases
by 18% and the number of transactions by 30%.
Panel B disaggregates activity according to intermediary type and finds, for nonan-
nouncement days, that the majority of active intermediaries acts as local (65%)20, followed
by dual (28%), and broker (7%). Clearly, dual activity continues to be substantial in the
aftermath of the 1992 Congress mandate (see section 1.1), in particular with regard to cus-
tomer trades. For the average five-minute interval, 34.5 duals carry out an aggregate 90.9
transactions for their customers vis-a`-vis 7.9 brokers who carry out 21.4 customer trans-
actions.21 Trade size is higher for brokers, but even in terms of volume duals carry out
most customer orders. Furthermore, bid-ask spread is higher for customer trades through
duals vis-a`-vis brokers, which is a first indication that their order flow includes the informed
customer orders.
For announcement days, activity is higher across all trader types, trades are larger,
and bid-ask spreads are higher. These changes appear to be proportional across trader types,
so that on a relative basis the nonannouncement day characterization of trading remains true
for announcement days. The same goes for the first 15 minutes after the announcement with
the exception that the proportional increase in customer trades is larger than the increase
in own-account trades.22
20100%*81.4/(81.4+35.4+7.9).
21Note that we find a slight difference between the number of duals active based on own-account counting
(35.4 per five-minute interval) or for-customer counting (34.5). This difference is due to the counting pro-
cedure, as, apparently, a dual’s own-account trading is more spread out in the day, while her costumer flow
concentrates in some intervals.
22These results are not included for brevity, but are available upon request.
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2 Customer order informativeness
In this section, we pursue our main objective, which is to establish the increased informative-
ness of customer flow after a macro announcement. We consider this an important result,
as it shows that intermediaries need off-exchange customer response to fully appreciate the
effect of the macro announcement on the 30Y riskfree rate. Saar (2007) interprets such
response as intermediaries who learn from imperfectly known endowments and preferences.
Previous studies, most notably Green (2004), document empirical support, but they rely on
interdealer flow. As mentioned in the introduction, this flow is “contaminated” by potential
superiorly informed intermediaries or, endogenously, by dual trading (see Appendix A).
2.1 Five-minute price change regressions on customer flow
We assess customer flow informativeness through a regression of five-minute price changes on
aggregate signed customer flow. We prefer time-interval return regressions (as in Brandt and
Kavajecz (2004) and Pasquariello and Vega (2007)) to trade return regressions (as in Green
(2004)), as the aggregation alleviates any effect time-stamp errors might have. Consistent
with previous studies, we add the macro surprise to the regression and estimate:
pt,h − pt,h−1 = da(αa + βaωt,h) + dn(αn + βnωt,h) +
∑
k
γkIk,tSk,t + εt,h (2)
where pt,h is 100 times the log price (to get % returns) at day t and five-minute interval
h, da (dn) is a dummy that is one on an announcement (nonannouncemement) day, zero
otherwise, ωt,h is the aggregate signed customer volume, Sk,t is the announcement surprise
(see equation (1)), Ik,t is a dummy that is one for the time interval immediately after the an-
nouncement, zero otherwise, and εt,k is the error term. The regression implicitly controls for
feedback trading through inclusion of the macro surprise, i.e. any effect of ωk,t is identified
off of the orthogonalized component relative to the other explanatory variables.23 We em-
phasize that this is a contribution of our approach, as Green (2004, p.1210) only includes the
surprise in the first transaction return after the announcement and therefore orthogonalizes
only the first postannouncement transaction.
23This relies on one of the statistical properties of linear regression, which is that any multivariate regression
coefficient can be obtained through univariate regression of the orthogonalized dependent variable on the
orthogonalized explanatory variable, where the orthogonalization is with respect to the other regressors.
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[insert Figure 3]
Figure 3 depicts the intraday pattern of customer flow informativeness on announce-
ment as well as nonannouncemement days. We estimate equation (2) separately for all 15-
minute intervals in the trading day and test whether the customer flow’s informativeness (β)
is significantly different on announcement days. We find it to be significantly higher in the
15 minutes subsequent to the announcement and generally insignificant for the remainder of
the day. Economically, informativeness roughly doubles and the intraday pattern is therefore
comparable—in shape and magnitude—to the bid-ask spread pattern.
[insert Table 3]
Table 3 presents the regression estimates for the 15 minutes after the announcement
(Panel A) and includes the macro surprise coefficients (Panel B). We find that 9 out of
the 15 announcement surprises significantly affects subsequent returns, where, generally,
procyclical announcements (e.g., nonfarm payroll employment) negatively affect returns and
countercyclical announcements (e.g., initial unemployment claims) positively affect returns.
Among these announcements, we find that nonfarm payroll employment, producer price
index (PPI), and consumer price index (CPI) have the largest economic impact. We therefore
repeat all regressions with only these three announcement days and with only nonfarm payroll
announcement days to, hopefully, find that any effect we find increases with the importance
of the news. Panel A shows that this is indeed the case for the customer flow informativeness
differential across announcement and nonannouncement days.
We decompose the explained price change variance and find that 24.0% is due to cus-
tomer order flow where we control for feedback trading. The R-squared reported in Panel A,
shows that the announcement day regression explains 36.6% of price change variance. We
use a Cholesky decomposition on the explained part to judge how much is due to the imme-
diate response to the announcement surprise and how much is due to subsequent customer
flow. In the ordering, we choose to put the announcement surprise first so that effectively
the contribution of customer flow is net of the component correlated with the announcement
surprise. That is, mathematically, the effect it assigns to customer flow is based on customer
flow orthogonalized relative to the surprise. The decomposition assigns 76.0% to the imme-
diate response and 24.0% to (orthogonalized) customer flow. In the procedure, we find that
6.7% of the explanatory power of customer flow is effectively due to feedback trading as it
is the size of the part that correlates with the announcement surprise.24
24We decompose the variation of X ′β where X is the matrix of explanatory variables and β is vector of
coefficient estimates. The customer flow is the last element in the X . Cholesky decomposes the customer flow
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2.2 An alternative interpretation of the regression coefficient
So far, we interpret our regression coefficient as trade informativeness. In inactive markets,
part of the price change correlated with order flow is transitory in nature in order to com-
pensate a liquidity supplier for the cost of market-making. We consider such effect unlikely
for our five-minute regressions in what is a very active market; we find 172.9 intermediaries
active who collectively generate 595.9 transactions in the average five-minute interval on
announcement days (see Table 2).
[insert Table 4]
We rerun the regressions with decomposed customer flow to provide further evidence
of informativeness. We decompose customer flow according to whether it reaches the floor
through brokers (who do not trade for own-account that day) or through duals. The results
in Table 4 show that yield changes are only significantly more sensitive to dual-intermediated
customer flow on announcement days. The unchanged sensitivity to broker-intermediated
customer flow is not a straightforward result of order size, as, if anything, brokers intermedi-
ate larger customer orders than duals do (see Table 2). Thus, this differential in sensitivity
across dual- and broker-intermediated flow rules out a noninformation explanation based on
increased price concession due to market-making costs, as this would affect all customer flow
equally. Rather, we believe that the intermediary’s decision to trade for own account is en-
dogenous and depends on whether she traces informed customers in her customer flow in the
aftermath of the announcement. We note that this result is consistent with the higher bid-
ask spread reported for dual-intermediated customer trades relative to broker-intermediated
customer trades (see section 1.3).
3 Intermediary’s own-account trading
With the result of increased customer flow informativeness after an information event, we
analyze whether intermediaries benefit from direct access to customer flow through own-
account trading. As mentioned in the introduction, screening out the customer flow and
(explanatory) variation into a part that is projected onto the macro surprises (“feedback part”, 6.7%) and
an orthogonalized part (93.3%). In the procedure we subtract off of the orthogonalized part the explained
variation on nonannouncement days to single out the effect due to the increased informativeness.
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discriminating informed from uninformed customers, the intermediary’s rational strategy is
to trade along with informed customers and opposite to uninformed orders (see Appendix A).
3.1 Is direct access to customer flow profitable?
We analyze own-account trading profitability for intermediaries with access to customer
flow (duals) and intermediaries without such access (locals) in the 15 minutes after the
announcement. We follow Fishman and Longstaff (1992) and define profitability as:
pikt =


Ns
kt∑
j=1
qsjktP
s
jkt −
Nb
kt∑
j=1
qbjktP
b
jkt + (
Nb
kt∑
j=1
qbjkt −
Ns
kt∑
j=1
qsjkt)REFPt

 /max(
Nb
kt∑
j=1
qbjkt,
Ns
kt∑
j=1
qsjkt)
(3)
where pikt is the profit per round-trip contract
25 for intermediary k on day t, N bkt (N
s
kt) is
the total number of buys (sells), qbjkt (q
s
jkt) is the quantity of the jth transaction in terms of
number of contracts, P bjkt (P
s
jkt) is the associated price, and REFPt is the reference price in
day t. The profit calculation assumes that the intermediary starts with zero inventory and
liquidates his end-of-period position at a reference price REFPt. We present results where
we set the reference price equal to the last transaction price in the measurement interval.
For robustness, we also analyze profits based on the end-of-day settlement price as reference
price, which gives qualitatively similar results.26 We note that, by construction, this profit
is net of adverse-selection cost (as it aggregates across multiple subsequent transactions and
therefore includes losses due to adverse selection), but gross of market-making cost (e.g.,
inventory cost, order-procession cost).
[insert Table 5]
Table 5 reports round-trip profitability per contract for duals and locals on an-
nouncement and nonannouncement days. We find very large standard deviations due to some
extreme positive and negative observations. We therefore prefer a nonparametric test on me-
dian differences to the standard test on mean differences (see also Fishman and Longstaff
(1992)). A * (**) indicates a significant difference between announcement and nonannounce-
ment days at the 5% (1%) level, whereas x (xx) indicates a significant difference between
dual profitability and local profitability. We emphasize two important results.
25We use a per-contract profit measure to control for trade activity, as locals are more active than duals.
26Available from the authors upon request.
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First, we find that a local’s profitability on own-account trading is higher on an-
nouncement days and increases with the importance of the announcement. We find that
locals make a median $0.0 per contract traded round-trip on nonannouncement days. It is
significantly higher on announcement days, $7.8, which amounts to an approximate27 $1,063
per local for the full 15 minutes. It further increases with the importance of the announce-
ment to $14.8 per contract on nonfarm, PPI, and CPI days to $23.7 on the nonfarm days. We
interpret this as evidence of increased profits to compensate for the higher cost of carrying
inventory through very volatile times.
Second, we find that duals appear to benefit from direct access to customer flow as
they trade more profitably for own-account than locals do and, more importantly, this differ-
ential is higher on announcement days. We find that duals make a median $2.2 per contract
on nonannouncement days, which is significantly higher than the $0.0 locals make. The re-
sult indicates that customer order flow is informative even on nonannouncement days. The
important result, however, is that this differential is significantly higher on announcement
days. Round-trip profit per contract is $6.1 ($13.9-$7.8) higher for duals on announcement
days, $8.0 higher on nonfarm, PPI, and CPI days, and $7.6 higher on nonfarm days.
3.2 The alternative explanation: superior trading skills
Fishman and Longstaff (1992) entertain the alternative explanation that some traders have
superior trading skill—trade more profitably for own-account—and customers choose to
trade through these intermediaries to benefit from their skill. Thus, the correlation we
document between trading for customers and own-account profitability might be entirely
spurious. To control for skill, Fishman and Longstaff (1992, Table 4) analyze trading profit
of “nonpure” duals, i.e. intermediaries who some days trade for own-account only (local
days) and other days trade both for own-account and for customers (dual days). We use the
same approach in our sample.
[insert Table 6]
Panel A of Table 6 reports the profit differential of nonpure duals on the days they
have access to customer flow relative to the days that they do not (i.e. own-account prof-
27Based on 264.0 (“single-trip”) transactions of 11.3 contracts by 81.4 locals per five minutes on
nonannouncement days, a volume increase of 300% in the 15 minutes subsequent to an announce-
ment, a 21% increase active locals and a negligible increase in trade size on announcement days, i.e.
$1.063≈$7.8*264*.5*11.3*3*3/(81.4*1.21) (see Table 2 and Figure 2).
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itability on dual days minus own-account profitability on local days). We find that, on
their dual days, they earn a significantly higher profit than on their local days—the median
differential is $5.6 per round-trip contract. We then separate announcement and nonan-
nouncement days and do the same analysis. Interestingly, we find a significantly increased
profit for announcement days only. For nonannouncement days, we find no statistical dif-
ference, consistent with Fishman and Longstaff (1992). We conclude that, after control
for trading skill, we continue to find support for the premise that intermediaries need the
off-exchange customer flow to fully appreciate the effect of macro news and benefit from
discriminating the informed traders in their customer flow.
Panel B compares a nonpure dual’s local-day profit to a (pure) local’s profit and
finds no evidence of superior trading skill. For nonannouncement days, we find a profitability
of $0.0 and $0.1 on local days of nonpure duals and locals, respectively, which are not
significantly different. For announcement days, profitability is $7.8 and $7.8, respectively,
which, again, are not significantly different. The increased profits for announcement days
could very well reflect more costly inventory-keeping. The insignificant difference between
the local-day profit of nonpure duals and locals indicates that duals do not show superior
skill in interpreting the macro news. Hence, this is further evidence that access to customer
flow is the main cause for a dual’s increased profitability on announcement days.
3.3 Do profits increase with the level of customer flow access?
We exploit the cross-section of duals to further establish a relationship between own-account
profitability and access to customer order flow. We regress profit per contract of dual trader
l in the 15 minutes of postannouncement trading, pilt, on a measure of access to customer
flow and various control variables:
pilt = α + β1CUSTlt + β2V OLAt + β3COMPt +
∑
k
γk|Skt|+ εlt (4)
where CUSTlt proxies for dual l’s access to customer flow (e.g., number of customer trades
executed) in the 15 minutes following the announcement on day t, V OLAt is the volatility
measure (see section 1.3), COMPt is a competition proxy and is defined as the ratio of the
number of active intermediaries who trade for customers (i.e., dual and brokers) and the
number of customer trades, Skt is the macro surprise of announcement type k, and εlt is the
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error term.28 We control for a potential competition effect, as Wahal (1997), for example,
finds that the number of dealers matters for the bid-ask spread in the NASDAQ market,
which he interprets to be “consistent with the competitive model of dealers pricing.” We
relate a dual trader’s profit to her access to customer flow and, therefore, build a competition
proxy on how many rivals she has for each customer trade (i.e., duals and brokers). In
addition to equation (4), we perform a regression where we replace all control variables by
a day dummy to kill all the time effect and we therefore only get traction from the cross-
section.29 This makes it generally harder to find a significant estimate of β1.
30
[insert Table 7]
Table 7 shows that a dual’s own-account profitability increases with access to cus-
tomer flow (β1 > 0), which is only significant when we use proxies based on customer trades
rather than customer volume. We number the regression results based on the four proxies
we use to measure access to customer flow: The number of trades, the sum of signed trades,
volume, and the sum of signed volume. We use trades as well as volume to account for
potential trade size effect and we use signed and unsigned to account for a potential imbal-
ance effect. Per proxy, we perform three regressions: A univariate regression, a regression
with controls, and a regression with day dummies. The univariate results show a positive
coefficient for access to customer flow, but it is significant only for the trade-based proxies
(i.e. the number of trades and the sum of signed trades). This significance is robust to
addition of control variables or time dummies. And, consistent with our expectations, we
find that profits increase with volatility (e.g., to reflect more costly inventory keeping) and
decrease with the level of competition.
The finding that only the trade-based proxies explain profitability significantly (as
opposed to the volume proxies) is not surprising in view of the flow-based speculation result
that the intermediary benefits from discriminating informed from uninformed customer flow.
That is, she has more scope to discriminate if the number of trades increases on unchanged
volume, as she then interacts with more customers. Economically, the effect is substantial,
as a one standard deviation change in the number of trades executed for customers earns
the intermediary an additional $2.2 per contract on her own-account trades, which is a 15%
increase relative to her $13.9 median profit on announcement days.31
28For ease of exposition, we use the indicator l to relabel duals every day.
29This is the only regression where we have to revert to OLS as the addition of time dummies makes the
GMM procedure too demanding numerically.
30The model with controls is nested in the time dummy model, as the controls are effectively spanned by
the time dummies, i.e. they are a linear combination of these dummies.
31See Table 2 and Table 7.
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4 Who pays the dual’s rents?
The previous section documents that intermediaries with direct access to customer flow
benefit through own-account trading. We interpret this result as evidence of flow-based
speculation, where the intermediary privately observes the identity of the submitting cus-
tomer. In appendix A, we illustrate the mechanism in a simple extension of the Kyle (1985)
model where the intermediary benefits from discriminating informed from uninformed cus-
tomer flow. She trades in the same direction as her informed customer and opposite to her
uninformed customer.
In the single intermediary world with a rational, zero-profit market maker, the in-
termediary’s rents are paid for by her customers through an increased price concession the
market maker charges to protect herself against flow-based speculation. In an multiple in-
termediaries setting, who pays the dual’s rent critically depends on the extent that market
makers can infer which intermediaries are likely to engage in flow-based speculation. The
extremes are that (i) market makers get no signal or (ii) that they can fully discriminate
the flow-based speculators. In the first case, they charge all intermediaries the same price
concession and the dual’s rents are effectively paid for by all customers. In the second case,
the market maker only charges increased price concession to the flow-based speculators and,
as a result, only their customers pay the rents.
4.1 Profitability of dual- and broker-intermediated customer or-
ders
We analyze customer profits in the aftermath of the announcement to find whether dual-
intermediated customers pay a disproportionate part of their intermediary’s rents. We calcu-
late customer profits based on equation (3) where we replace the intermediary’s own-account
trades (CTI1) by customer trades (CTI4).
[insert Table 8]
Table 8 shows that a dual’s customer seems to pay a disproportionate part of her
rents. We find that on announcement days the broker-intermediated customer trades earn a
$0.0 median profit per round-trip contract, whereas dual-intermediated profit is significantly
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lower and amounts to $-7.3 per contract.32 This difference remains for the narrower sets
of important announcements, but it is insignificant potentially as a result of low power
due to the shrinking sample size. Fishman and Longstaff (1992), on the other hand, find
significantly higher profit for dual-intermediated customer flow, which is the null based on
a model where market maker cannot infer which intermediary has the informed customer
orders. That is, she charges all the same price concession, which should make customer profits
higher for dual-intermediated customer flow as it contains the positive profit of the informed
customer order. The broker-intermediated customer flow does not contain such informed
orders. We interpret our result as a sign that marker makers do get a signal on who has
the informed customer flow and rationally charge them an additional price concession (to
protect themselves against flow-based speculation).33 This interpretation is consistent with
our earlier result that the bid-ask spread is higher for dual-intermediated customer orders
relative to broker-intermediated ones.
4.2 Why do customers trade through duals?
If customers that trade through duals pay disproportionately, why do they choose to trade
through these intermediaries? In this section, we entertain several explanations. A key
difference between the explanations is persistence. That is, do intermediaries persistently
act as duals and brokers, so that market makers can infer their profile?
If not, customers do not really have a choice and, unconditionally, they do not
pay disproportionately. Absent persistence, customers do not know ex ante whether their
intermediary will get informed customer orders (and become dual) and they therefore do not
really have a choice. It is in the interest of informed customers to hide their type as much
as they can, which is consistent with switching intermediaries regularly.
If, on the other hand, there is persistence, the question is interesting: Why do
customers stay with an intermediary who trades for own account? One explanation is that
these intermediaries have superior trading skill. In section 3.2, we analyze trading skill
and do not find supportive evidence. Another explanation is that they receive unobserved
32The negative sign is intuitive as it indicates that customers pay for demanding liquiditiy.
33We find indirect supportive evidence based on ranking dual traders according to the number of dual
trader days. We find that customer profits of duals with more than median dual trader days are significantly
lower than customer profits of those with less than median dual trader days (both for announcement and
nonannouncement days). If we assume that duals with many dual trader days are easier to detect by the
trading pit, then one could interpret this result as supportive evidence. For brevity, we omit the table, but
it is available from the authors upon request.
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benefits, such as reduced commissions or free access to analyst reports.
5 Conclusion
We exploit detailed data on 42.5 million transactions in the 1994-1997 30Y treasury futures
market, which is a comprehensive dataset as it captures 95% of total volume (i.e. including
the underlying). We are able to discriminate the off-exchange customer orders and find
that they exhibit increased informativeness in the 15 minutes after an information event,
i.e. an 8:30 macro announcement. This suggests that intermediaries rely on off-exchange
order flow to fully appreciate how macro news affects the 30Y riskfree rate. Green (2004)
documents the increased informativeness for interdealer order flow; we contribute and show
that one channel is off-exchange customer “response” to the news. One interpretation is that
intermediaries learn about imperfectly known preferences and endowments in the economy
(see, e.g., Saar (2007)).
The data also enable us to analyze whether intermediaries who walk the customer
orders to the floor, benefit from the informed flow through own-account trading. We find
that in the 15 minutes after the announcement, they trade significantly more profitable for
own account than other intermediaries without direct access to customer flow: For example,
median profit per contract is 78% higher in the 15 minutes after the announcement. Addi-
tional analysis rules out the alternative explanation that these have superior trading skill.
We interpret the evidence as flow-based speculation by intermediaries, i.e. contrary to those
who do not have access to customer flow, they see the origination of the customer order and
trade along with it for own-account if it is an informed order, but opposite to it if it is an
uninformed order. Market markers rationally charge higher price concession and customers
therefore pay the intermediary’s rents. We analyze the cross-section of customer profitability
and find that dual-intermediated customer flow appears to pay disproportionately.
We consider our evidence on flow-based speculation useful for regulators. Ultimately,
customers pay the rents that intermediaries earn. This does not imply that flow-based
speculation should be banned, as customers can choose their own intermediary (if any) and
internalize the cost of flow-based speculation. We do, however, see a potential role for
transparency regulation, so that a customer can evaluate her intermediary’s performance.
We realize that transparency is costly or might arise endogenously. We leave this issue for
future research.
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Finally, one might think that with the arrival of electronic limit order markets the
issue of flow-based speculation disappears. We notice, however, that in these markets with
the potential of direct access, intermediaries have all but disappeared. We interpret this as
evidence that trading through intermediaries has certain benefits. Our study highlights one
important cost, which is flow-based speculation.
Appendix A
In this appendix, we use the Kyle (1985) model to illustrate that price impact is increased
in the presence of an intermediary who trades for her own account. The key engine for
this result is that, contrary to the intermediary, the market maker does not observe the
composition of customer flow. The intuition is that the rents earned by the intermediary are
paid for by customers through an increased price impact (as the market maker earns zero
rents).
Suppose v, the unknown payoff of the asset, is normally distributed with zero expec-
tation and variance equal to σ2v . The customers consist of an informed investor who knows
v and an uninformed investor who exogenously trades an amount u, which is normally dis-
tributed with zero expectation and variance σ2u.
Without an intermediary, Kyle (1985) finds the following unique linear equilibrium:
X(v) = βv, β =
1
2λ
(linear strategy of informed investor) (5)
P (ω) = E[v|ω] = λω, λ = (
1
2
)
1
2
σv
σu
(market maker earns zero rents) (6)
where ω = X(v) + u is the aggregate order flow the market maker receives.
We deviate from the standard setting and introduce an intermediary who observes
the origination of the customer order and adds her own order y before submitting the ag-
gregate order flow to the market maker. We restrict y to be a linear order:
y = αv + γu (7)
The informed trader rationally anticipates the intermediary’s action and internalizes her
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response when choosing β. We work backward and solve sequentially:
1. We condition on λ and β to maximize the intermediary’s expected profit:
E[(P − v)y] = E[(λω − v)y] = E[λ((α + β)v + (1 + γ)u)− v)(αv + γu)] (8)
which yields:
α =
1
2
(
1
λ
− β), γ = −
1
2
(9)
We find that (i) the intermediary trades less aggressively on the true value v if the
informed customer submits a larger order (higher β) or if liquidity is lower (higher λ)
and that (ii) she rationally takes the opposite side of the uninformed order (γ < 0).
2. We condition on λ and on the intermediary’s action to maximize profits for the informed
trader and find:
β =
1
2λ
(10)
The result is that the aggregate order loads more heavily on the signal (α+β = 3
4λ
> 1
2λ
(see equation (5)) as the informed trader now competes with the intermediary on her
information.
3. Given the optimal strategy of the intermediary and the informed trader, we find λ by
setting the risk-neutral market maker’s expected profit equal to zero, i.e.
E[v|ω] = λω ⇔
cov(ω, v)
var(ω)
= λω ⇔ λ = (
3
4
)
1
2
σv
σu
> (
1
2
)
1
2
σv
σu
(see equation (6)) (11)
where ω = ((α+β)v+(1+γ)u) is the aggregate order the market maker receives. Eqn.
(11) shows that the price impact is increased in the presence of an intermediary and
identifies two sources for the increased impact. First, the covariance in the numerator
is increased due to more aggressive trading on the value v. We note, however, that the
denominator is also increased to reflect the larger size of the order. Second, we find
that the denominator is decreased due to less net “noise” trading as a result of the
intermediary’s strategy to trade opposite to the uninformed order.
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Table 1: Announcement and Nonannouncement Days
This table shows the number of announcement and nonannouncement days in our sample, and the frequency
of each announcement. The data on macroeconomic announcements is from the International Money Market
Services (MMS). The announcement days are days on which there is an 8:30 announcement and no other
announcement in the morning (i.e., no 9:15 and 10:00 announcements). Nonannouncement days are days
on which there are no announcements at all in the morning. There are three groups of announcement days:
the first group contains all 8:30 announcements, the second group consists of the important announcement
types (Nonfarm Payroll Employment, PPI, and CPI), and the third group contains only the Nonfarm Payroll
Employment announcements. We exclude days when either the realized value or the expectation is missing,
days on which the Fed made an earlier than usual or an unexpected announcement, the day on which the
Durable Goods Orders figure was announced at 09:00 or 10:00, two days on which the market closed at 11:00
(4/1/94 and 4/5/96) and four days on which the market closed for a part of the day (9/14/94, 8/26/96,
2/26/97 and 2/27/97).
Panel A: Announcement vs. Nonannouncement Days
1994 1995 1996 1997 Total
All Trading Days 253 250 252 250 1,005
Nonannouncement Days 84 91 88 87 350
All Announcement Days 98 90 89 100 377
Nonfarm, PPI, and CPI 27 26 25 27 105
Nonfarm Payroll Employment 9 8 7 10 34
Panel B: Announcement Types and Frequencies
Announcement Type 1994 1995 1996 1997 Total
GDP Advance 3 4 1 4 12
GDP Preliminary 3 1 1 2 7
GDP Final 3 0 5 2 10
Nonfarm Payroll Employment 9 8 7 10 34
Retail Sales 9 11 9 12 41
Personal Income 5 3 5 4 17
Personal Consumption Expenditure 5 3 5 4 17
Durable Goods Orders 11 11 8 7 37
Business Inventories 0 0 0 7 7
Net Exports 12 10 11 11 44
Producer Price Index 11 11 11 10 43
Consumer Price Index 7 7 7 7 28
Housing Starts 11 9 10 9 39
Index of Leading Indicators 5 2 6 6 19
Initial Unemployment Claims 40 37 36 43 156
Table 2: Trade Statistics by Trader Type
In Panel A, we show the average number of active traders, number of transactions and trade size per
five minute interval for the 30Y treasury futures listed on the Chicago Board of Trade (CBOT) on both
announcement and nonannouncement days. In Panel B, these variables, together with bid-ask spread (in $),
are shown for different trader types. We define a floor trader to be a local (broker) on a day if the proportion
of volume for her own account, as a ratio of total (own-account + customer) volume, is greater than 98%
(smaller than 2%). A floor trader is a dual on a day if this proportion is greater than or equal to 2% but
less than or equal to 98%. The sample period is from 1994 to 1997.
Panel A: Overall (five min avg)
Ann Nonann Ratio
#Traders Active 172.9 146.0 1.18
#Transactions 595.9 458.2 1.30
Trade size 12.4 11.6 1.07
Panel B: Breakdown according to Trader Type (five min avg)
Own Account (CTI 1) For Customer (CTI 4)
Ann Nonann Ratio Ann Nonann Ratio
#Traders Active 138.3 116.8 1.18 50.9 42.4 1.20
as a local 98.3 81.4 1.21
as a dual 40.0 35.4 1.13 41.3 34.5 1.20
as a broker 9.6 7.9 1.21
#Transactions 450.3 345.9 1.30 145.7 112.3 1.30
through local 353.3 264.0 1.34
through dual 96.9 81.8 1.18 117.4 90.9 1.29
through broker 28.2 21.4 1.32
Trade Size 10.9 10.2 1.07 17.5 16.1 1.09
through local 12.0 11.3 1.06
through dual 6.9 6.5 1.07 16.8 15.2 1.11
through broker 20.6 19.6 1.05
Bid-Ask Spreada (in $) 6.4 5.6 1.14
through dual 6.7 5.9 1.13
through broker 4.3 3.4 1.26
a We estimate the bid-ask spread as the difference between the average (volume-weighted) customer buy
price and the average customer sell price (see also Manaster and Mann (1996)).
Table 3: Regressions of 30Y Treasury Return on Customer Order Flow
This table reports the estimation results of the following regression:
pt,h − pt,h−1 = da(αa + βaωt,h) + dn(αn + βnωt,h) +
∑
k
γkIk,tSk,t + εt,h
where pt,h is 100 times the log price of the 30Y treasury futures at day t and five minute interval h, da (dn)
is a dummy that is one on an announcement (nonannouncement) day, zero otherwise, ωt,h is the aggregate
signed customer volume divided by 1,000, Sk,t is the announcement surprise, Ik,t is a dummy that is one
for the time interval immediately after the announcement, zero otherwise, and εt,k is the error term. For
estimation, we use the Feasible Efficient GMM procedure with a Newey-West estimator (using three lags) for
standard errors. Panel A reports the estimates of the intercept and customer order flow coefficients estimated
for 8:30-8:45 based on five minute intervals and tests for equality of customer order flow coefficients. Panel
B presents the coefficients of the various macro surprises for the “all announcements” sample (the other
samples show similar results). We report t-values below coefficient estimates.
Panel A: 30Y Treasury Return Regressions
Nonfarm, PPI, Nonfarm
All Ann and CPI Payroll Emp.
Customer Flow Ann βa 0.0493
∗∗
10.4
0.0544∗∗
6.06
0.0571∗∗
3.77
Nonann βn 0.0256
∗∗
9.67
0.0256∗∗
9.67
0.0256∗∗
9.67
Intercept Ann αa −0.0118
∗∗
−2.75
−0.0364∗∗
−2.69
−0.0974∗∗
−3.26
Nonann αn 0.0033
∗
2.32
0.0033∗
2.32
0.0033∗
2.32
#Observations Total 2,181 1,365 1,152
Ann 1,131 315 102
Nonann 1,050 1,050 1,050
R2 0.366 0.354 0.369
p-value of H0: βa = βn 0.0000
∗∗ 0.0021∗∗ 0.0410∗
*/** indicates significance at the 5%/1% level.
(continued on next page)
(continued from previous page)
Panel B: Announcement Surprise Coefficients
Announcement type Surprise Coefficient t-value
GDP Advance -0.085∗ -2.13
GDP Preliminary -0.203 -1.68
GDP Final 0.036 1.91
Nonfarm Payroll Emp. -0.469 ∗∗ -3.06
Retail Sales -0.111 ∗∗ -2.95
Personal Income -0.006 -0.27
Pers. Consumption Exp. 0.007 0.30
Dur. Goods Orders -0.105 ∗∗ -3.97
Business Inventories -0.098 ∗ -2.04
Net Exports -0.006 -0.44
Producer Price Index -0.175 ∗∗ -4.41
Consumer Price Index -0.121 ∗ -2.54
Housing Starts -0.105 ∗∗ -5.32
Index of Leading Ind. -0.018 -0.67
Init. Unemployment Cl. 0.043 ∗∗ 3.56
*/** indicates significance at the 5%/1% level.
Table 4: Return Regressions: Dual- vs. Broker-Intermediated Customer Flow
This table follows up on Table 3 and decomposes customer flow into dual- vs. broker-intermediated customer
flow. It reports the estimation results of the following regression:
pt,h − pt,h−1 = da(αa + β
d
aω
d
t,h + β
b
aω
b
t,h) + dn(αn + β
d
nω
d
t,h + β
b
nω
b
t,h) +
∑
k
γkIk,tSk,t + εt,h
where pt,h is 100 times the log price of the 30Y treasury futures at day t and five minute interval h, da (dn) is a
dummy that is one on an announcement (nonannouncement) day, zero otherwise, ωdt,h (ω
b
t,h) is the aggregate
signed customer volume intermediated by duals (brokers) divided by 1,000, Sk,t is the announcement surprise,
Ik,t is a dummy that is one for the time interval immediately after the announcement, zero otherwise, and
εt,k is the error term. For estimation, we use the Feasible Efficient GMM procedure with a Newey-West
estimator (using three lags) for standard errors. We report the estimates of the intercept and customer order
flow coefficients estimated for 8:30-8:45 based on five minute intervals and tests for equality of customer order
flow coefficients. We report t-values below coefficient estimates.
30Y Treasury Return Regressions, Dual- vs. Broker-Intermediated Customer Flow
Nonfarm, PPI, Nonfarm
All Ann and CPI Payroll Emp.
Customer Flow Ann Dual βda 0.0562
∗∗
10.0
0.0650∗∗
5.70
0.0762∗∗
3.60
Broker βba 0.0238
∗
2.53
0.0209
1.27
−0.0197
−0.49
Nonann Dual βdn 0.0265
∗∗
8.92
0.0265∗∗
8.92
0.0265∗∗
8.92
Broker βbn 0.0230
∗∗
4.77
0.0230∗∗
4.77
0.0230∗∗
4.77
Intercept Ann αa −0.0119
∗∗
−2.79
−0.0367∗∗
−2.72
−0.0931∗∗
−3.23
Nonann αn 0.0035
∗
2.34
0.0035∗
2.34
0.0035∗
2.34
#Observations Total 2,181 1,365 1,152
Ann 1,131 315 102
Nonann 1,050 1,050 1,050
R2 0.375 0.366 0.396
p-value of H0: β
d
a
= βd
n
0.0000∗∗ 0.0011∗∗ 0.0202∗
βb
a
= βb
n
0.9400 0.9000 0.2880
βd
a
= βb
a
0.0036∗∗ 0.0343∗ 0.0628
βd
n
= βb
n
0.5110 0.5110 0.5110
*/** indicates significance at the 5%/1% level.
Table 5: Own-Account Trading Profits by Trader Type
This table reports summary statistics on the cross-sectional distribution of proprietary trading profits by
trader type. We distinguish two types: those who also trade for customers on the same day, i.e. duals, and
those who do not trade for customers on that day, i.e. locals. We follow Fishman and Longstaff (1992)
and calculate the profits per contract traded round trip. That is, for each trader we subtract the value of
purchases from the value of sales and add the value of end-of-period inventory (assuming zero inventory at
the start). We divide this by the total number of contracts traded to arrive at a profit per contract traded
round trip. Formally, we calculate:
pikt =


Ns
kt∑
j=1
qsjktP
s
jkt −
Nb
kt∑
j=1
qbjktP
b
jkt + (
Nb
kt∑
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kt∑
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qsjkt)REFPt

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qsjkt),
where pikt is the profit per round-trip contract for intermediary k on day t, N
b
kt (N
s
kt) is the total number
of buys (sells), qbjkt (q
s
jkt) is the quantity of the jth transaction in terms of number of contracts, P
b
jkt (P
s
jkt)
is the associated price, and REFPt is the reference price in day t. We assume any remaining inventory
is valued at the last price before 8:45, thus REFPt is the last observed price before 8:45. We show the
mean, standard deviation (St Dev) and the three quartiles (25% Quant, Median and 75% Quant) of the
cross-sectional distribution (across intermediaries) of own-account trading profits (with the number of trader
days in each group in the column #Trader Days).
Own-Account Trading Profits per Contract Traded Round Trip
#Trader 25% 75%
Days Mean St Dev Quant Median Quant
Locals
nonannouncement days 64,713 2.5 38.2 -13.5 0.0xx 20.8
all announcement days 83,516 8.4 67.4 -13.2 7.8∗∗,xx 31.2
nonfarm, PPI, and CPI 25,301 17.0 93.0 -12.1 14.8∗∗,xx 43.9
nonfarm payroll emp. 8,242 26.7 117.8 -11.1 23.7∗∗,xx 62.5
Duals
nonannouncement days 17,181 4.6 46.7 -15.6 2.2xx 31.2
all announcement days 26,474 16.5 99.0 -13.4 13.9∗∗,xx 40.5
nonfarm, PPI, and CPI 8,381 29.6 142.2 -14.2 22.8∗∗,xx 62.5
nonfarm payroll emp. 2,709 49.0 199.1 -12.5 31.3∗∗,xx 101.6
*/** indicates significance relative to nonannouncement days at the 5%/1% level.
x/xx indicates significance relative to the other trader type at the 5%/1% level (i.e. a comparison across local
and dual profit).
Table 6: Own-Account Trading Profits of Nonpure Duals and Pure Locals
This table reports own-account trading profits of nonpure duals, i.e. intermediaries who have both dual
days (i.e. days they also trade for customers) and local days (i.e. days they do not trade for customers).
Panel A reports cross-sectional statistics across all nonpure duals on the difference in average own-account
profit for dual days and local days. Panel B reports cross-sectional statistics for the average own-account
profit of nonpure duals on local days and similar statistics for the average own-account profit of pure locals
(i.e. intermediaries that never trade for customers). To obtain own-account trading profits for each trader
we subtract the value of purchases from the value of sales and add the value of end-of-period inventory
(assuming zero inventory at the start). We divide this by the total number of contracts traded to arrive at
a profit per contract traded round trip. Formally, we calculate:
pikt =


Ns
kt∑
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qsjktP
s
jkt −
Nb
kt∑
j=1
qbjktP
b
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where pikt is the profit per round-trip contract for intermediary k on day t, N
b
kt (N
s
kt) is the total number
of buys (sells), qbjkt (q
s
jkt) is the quantity of the jth transaction in terms of number of contracts, P
b
jkt (P
s
jkt)
is the associated price, and REFPt is the reference price in day t. We assume any remaining inventory is
valued at the last price before 8:45, thus REFPt is the last observed price before 8:45.
Panel A: Nonpure Duals’ Profit Advantage
on their Dual Days relative to their Local Days
Nonann Ann
Difference in Profits All Days Days Days
#Nonpure Duals 234 184 200
Mean Profit Advantage 8.6 2.8 13.5
Standard Deviation 59.1 35.9 68.0
25% Quantile -8.3 -12.6 -10.2
Median 5.6 3.5 5.0
75% Quantile 24.6 14.7 34.7
%-age Coeff’s positive 63.2 55.4 58.0
Test z-statistica 4.05 1.47 2.26
a Test statistic standard normal under H0.
Panel B: Trading Profits on Local Days, Pure Locals vs Nonpure Duals
#Trader 25% 75%
Days Mean St Dev Quant Median Quant
Local Days of Pure Local
nonannouncement days 33,083 2.8 37.4 -12.7 0.1 20.4
all announcement days 42,808 8.7 67.2 -13.6 7.8∗∗ 31.2
nonfarm, PPI, and CPI 18,499 16.7 90.2 -11.7 14.4∗∗ 42.7
nonfarm payroll emp. 6,911 26.5 115.8 -11.6 23.4∗∗ 61.7
Local Days of Nonpure Dual
nonannouncement days 27,880 2.3 38.3 -13.9 0.0 20.8
all announcement days 36,061 8.5 67.4 -12.9 7.8∗∗ 31.2
nonfarm, PPI, and CPI 5,887 17.8 101.6 -13.5 15.6∗∗ 47.8
nonfarm payroll emp. 1,100 27.7 131.2 -7.8 25.2∗∗ 65.4
*/** indicates significance relative to nonannouncement days at the 5%/1% level.
x/xx indicates significance relative to the other trader type at the 5%/1% level (i.e. a comparison across local
days of pure local and local days of nonpure dual profit).
Table 7: Determinants of Dual Trader’s Own Account Profits on Announcement Days
This table reports the estimation results of the following regression:
pilt = α+ β1CUSTlt + β2V OLAt + β3COMPt +
∑
k
γk|Skt|+ εlt
where pilt is dual l’s own-account profit per round trip trade in the 15 minutes following the announcement on day t, CUSTlt proxies for dual
trader l’s access to customer flow, V OLAt is the volatility measure, COMPt is a competition proxy and is defined as the ratio of the number
of active intermediaries who trade for customers (i.e. dual and brokers) and the number of customer trades, Skt is the macro surprise of
announcement type k, and εlt is the error term. We use four proxies for a dual’s access to customer order flow: the number of trades of dual l
on day t that come from customers
∑
j |D
c
j,l,t| (model (1)), the absolute value of the sum of the signed number of trades |
∑
j D
c
j,l,t| (model (2)),
the total quantity of dual l on day t that comes from customers
∑
j Q
c
j,l,t (model (3)) and the absolute value of the sum of the signed quantity
|
∑
j D
c
j,l,tQ
c
j,l,t| (model (4)) where D
c
j,l,t represents the direction (+1 for buy, -1 for sell) of trade j for trader l on day t. All regressors are
demeaned to let the intercept represent the average trading profit per round trip in the 8:30-8:45 interval of a dual on an announcement day.
For estimation, we use the Feasible Efficient GMM procedure with a Newey-West estimator (using three lags) for standard errors.
Dependent Variable: Dual’s Trading Profit per Contract Traded Round Trip in the 8:30-8:45 interval on Ann Days
(1) (1’) (1”)a (2) (2’) (2”)a (3) (3’) (3”)a (4) (4’) (4”)a
Proxies for CUSTlt
trades∑
j |D
c
j,k,t| 0.582
∗∗
5.06
0.233∗
2.03
0.211∗∗
3.3
signed trades
|
∑
j D
c
j,k,t| 1.13
∗∗
4.95
0.727∗∗
3.28
0.726∗∗
6.23
quantity∑
j Q
c
j,k,t 0.00358
1.45
−0.00150
−0.609
−0.00159
−1.13
signed quantity
|
∑
j D
c
j,k,tQ
c
j,k,t| 0.00668
1.52
−0.00118
−0.271
−0.00143
−0.488
Intercept 16.5∗∗
26.2
16.5∗∗
26.8
16.5∗∗
26.2
16.5∗∗
26.9
16.5∗∗
26.1
16.5∗∗
26.8
16.5∗∗
26
16.5∗∗
26.8
Control Variables
volatility 2.86∗∗
3.13
2.82∗∗
3.09
3.02∗∗
3.25
3.01∗∗
3.24
competition −23.5
−1.79
−24.1
−1.88
−32.1∗∗
−2.58
−31.3∗
−2.51
surprise? yes yes yes yes
time dummy? yes yes yes yes
#Observations 26,474 26,474 26,474 26,474 26,474 26,474 26,474 26,474 26,474 26,474 26,474 26,474
R2 0.004 0.017 0.039 0.004 0.018 0.040 0.000 0.016 0.039 0.000 0.016 0.039
*/** indicates significance at the 5%/1% level.
a We use OLS instead of GMM as GMM estimation becomes too demanding numerically.
Table 8: Customer Profits of Dual- vs. Broker-Intermediated Trades
This table reports customer trading profits of dual- and broker- intermediated customer trades, where dual
traders also trade for own-account on that day and brokers do not. We follow Fishman and Longstaff (1992)
and calculate the aggregate customer profits per contract traded round trip. That is, for each dual and
broker trader we subtract the value of her customer purchases from the value of her customer sales and
add the value of end-of-period inventory (assuming zero inventory at the start). We divide this by the total
number of customer contracts traded to arrive at a profit per contract traded round trip. Formally, we
calculate:
pikt =


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where pikt is the customer profit per round-trip contract for intermediary k on day t, N
b
kt (N
s
kt) is the total
number of customer buys (sells), qbjkt (q
s
jkt) is the quantity of the jth customer transaction in terms of number
of contracts, P bjkt (P
s
jkt) is the associated price, and REFPt is the reference price in day t. We assume any
remaining inventory is valued at the last price before 8:45, thus REFPt is the last observed price before
8:45. We show the mean, standard deviation (St Dev) and the three quartiles (25% Quant, Median and 75%
Quant) of the cross-sectional distribution (across intermediaries) of her customers’ aggregate trading profits
(with the number of trader days in each group in the column #Trader Days).
Customer Profits per Contract Traded Round Trip
#Trader 25% 75%
Days Mean St Dev Quant Median Quant
Dual-Intermediated Customer Trades
nonannouncement days 17,181 -3.0 65.1 -32.5 0.0x 31.3
all announcement days 26,474 -12.6 129.5 -67.7 -7.3∗∗,xx 49.0
nonfarm, PPI, and CPI 8,381 -22.7 175.8 -104.2 -17.5∗∗ 63.5
nonfarm payroll emp. 2,709 -35.0 225.0 -147.1 -25.8∗∗ 87.3
Broker-Intermediated Customer Trades
nonannouncement days 6,567 -1.3 70.2 -31.3 0.0x 31.3
all announcement days 9,034 -7.3 143.3 -62.5 0.0∗∗,xx 58.0
nonfarm, PPI, and CPI 2,843 -14.9 200.3 -101.7 -11.3∗∗ 73.9
nonfarm payroll emp. 970 -23.2 250.9 -145.4 -19.3∗∗ 94.1
*/** indicates significance relative to nonannouncement days at the 5%/1% level.
x/xx indicates significance relative to the other trader type at the 5%/1% level (i.e. a comparison across dual
and broker aggregate customer profit).
Figure 1: Price and Volume of 30Y Treasury Futures on an Announcement Day
This figure depicts the prices of the 30Y treasury bond futures listed on the Chicago Board of Trade (CBOT)
in the interval 8:20-9:00 on January 7, 1994. On this day there was an 8:30 Nonfarm Payroll Employment
announcement. The top graph plots the volume-weighted average price for the second, where we use a circle
(cross) if customer buying volume exceeds (falls below or equals) customer selling volume. The bottom figure
plots the aggregate customer volume for every second.
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Figure 2: Intraday Trading Patterns
These figures depict intraday pattern of volatility (A), volume (B), and the bid-ask spread (C), based on
fifteen minute intervals. The solid (dashed) lines show the intraday pattern for announcement (nonannounce-
ment) days, the solid vertical lines represent the 8:30-8:45 announcement interval. An open (closed) circle
indicates a significant difference between announcement and nonannouncement days at the 5% (1%) level.
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Figure 3: Intraday Pattern of Sensitivity of Treasury Return to Customer Flow
This figure depicts the coefficient of customer order flow in the 30Y treasury future return regressions. It
plots this coefficient based on the estimation results of the following regression for all 15 minute intervals in
the day:
pt,h − pt,h−1 = da(αa + βaωt,h) + dn(αn + βnωt,h) +
∑
k
γkIk,tSk,t + εt,h
where pt,h is 100 times the log price of the 30Y treasury futures at day t and five minute interval h, da (dn)
is a dummy that is one on an announcement (nonannouncement) day, zero otherwise, ωt,h is the aggregate
signed customer volume, Sk,t is the announcement surprise, Ik,t is a dummy that is one for the time interval
immediately after the announcement, zero otherwise, and εt,k is the error term. For estimation, we use the
Feasible Efficient GMM procedure with a Newey-West estimator (using three lags) for standard errors. The
solid (dashed) line depicts the intraday pattern of β for announcement (nonannouncement) days; the vertical
line represents the 8:30-8:45 announcement interval. An open (closed) circle indicates a significant difference
between announcement and nonannouncement days at the 5% (1%) level.
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